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This paper explores Britain's and the United States' 
relationship with the Middle East, as specific examples of 
the theory of imperialism. The economic theory of 
imperialism, as understood by Marxian theoreticians and 
specifically Harry Magdoff, is used to explain these 
relationships. It is shown that the history of both 
Britain's and the United States' involvement in the Middle 
East conforms to the patterns outlined in the Marxian 
theory of imperialism. The economic motivations for 
Britain's involvement in the Middle East are shown to be 
similar to those of the United States' involvement, and 
both of these are consistent with the theory of 
imperialism. In addition, it is shown that, consistent 
with the Marxian theory of imperialism, Iraq's political 
economic dependence on the United States prevents it from 
achieving the kind of autonomous development and democracy 





CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .......................... 1
CHAPTER TWO: IMPERIALISM AS A STAGE OF CAPITALISM
DEFINED ................................ 5
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF WESTERN INVOLVEMENT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST.......................... 24
CHAPTER FOUR: WESTERN INVOLVEMENT IN THE OIL
INDUSTRY OF THE MIDDLE EAST........... 62
CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARING BRITISH AND UNITED STATES
INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
RESULTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
STRUCTURES IN IRAQ................... 83




I will be relying on Harry Magdoff's theory of 
imperialism to explain the relationship between Great 
Britain, the United States, and the Middle East. The 
nature of imperialism has changed over time from that of 
the overt colonialism which European powers practiced from 
the late 15th century until the 19th century, and in some 
cases the 20th century, to the much more covert form of 
economic domination which core imperial powers, such as the 
United States, now exercise over peripheral nations. The 
history of Great Britain and the United States in the 
Middle East conforms to the classic Marxian theory of 
imperialism; and the latter theory explains the economic 
motivations for Britain's and the United States' 
involvement in the Middle East, while predicting the 
emergence of dependent political economic structures among 
peripheral nations, such as Iraq.
Imperialism is a mechanism by which a dominant power 
is able to control the trade, investment, labor, and 
natural resources of other peoples. It can take different 
forms in different stages of capitalist development and 
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evolves out of the need for profits on the part of 
capitalists and corporations (Tabb 2007). This need for 
profits motivates the capitalist and/or corporation in the 
dominant nation to seek business opportunities in foreign, 
peripheral nations. And the need to ensure a flow of 
profits from these foreign investment opportunities 
motivates capitalists to create political economic 
relationships, in both the dominant and peripheral nation, 
that help bring this about. Western capitalist powers have 
had relations with the Middle East of an imperialist nature 
since before the 20th century because of its strategic 
location and abundant supplies of natural resources, 
specifically oil. What's more this relationship has led to 
the creation of political economic structures that prevent 
many nations of the Middle East from achieving autonomous 
economic growth and democracy.
Western interest in the Middle East began long before 
the discovery of oil in the region. During the period of 
the Ottoman Empire from the early 1800's various trade 
agreements were established between European governments 
and the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of securing markets 
for European investors. As Britain expanded it's global 
empire, the Middle East became an increasingly important 
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region; providing it with land access to India and a 
strategic location from which to defend it's Asian 
dependencies. With the discovery of oil in the region 
British interests increased as their economy transitioned 
to being fueled by oil rather than coal. As other 
industrial nations followed, control of the petroleum 
resources in the region intensified the intervention in the 
region. In the post World War I era the U.S. became 
involved in the petroleum industry of the Middle East, and 
following World War II that involvement increased even 
more. The history of British and U.S. involvement in the 
Middle East is outlined to show that western involvement in 
the Middle East is not new and that it conforms to the 
Marxian theory of imperialism. The British involvement in 
the region from 1918 to 1925 is compared to U.S. 
involvement there from 2003 to present. The similarities 
in the political and economic motivations of the British 
and the U.S. for involvement in the region are examined, as 
well as the political and economic structures that evolved 
as a result of these relationships. The dominant classes 
within the Middle East have played a role in maintaining 
the imperial relations with the capitalist powers due to 
the benefits these relationships bring to them. However,
3
the continuation of the relationship has led to a lack of 
democracy and autonomous economic development.
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CHAPTER TWO
IMPERIALISM AS A STAGE OF CAPITALISM DEFINED
In this chapter I will discuss imperialism, including 
the role of the state and the importance of the export of 
capital in this stage of capitalism, as well as the causes 
and conditions that give way to this stage in capitalist 
development, as explained in the works of Harry Magdoff. 
Magdoff has summarized the stages of capitalism, and as 
William Tabb points out in his article "Imperialism: In 
Tribute to Harry Magdoff", this summary provides a useful 
guide for how ongoing technological advancements and 
changes in government policies and practices influence 
imperialism and the global order. Tabb states in his 
article that Magdoff's summary of the stages of capitalism 
has,
. . .explained the global transitions: from
direct robbery, looting, plunder, and piracy in 
the first wave of European overseas expansion at 
the end of the fifteenth century; through the 
domination of commercial capital from the 
seventeenth to the late eighteenth century; to 
global intercapitalist rivalry, the rise of 
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industrial capital, and the new imperialism; and 
then to the stage of decolonization and the rise 
of the multinational corporation." (Tabb 2007)
Imperialism can be summarized as a phase in the development 
of world economy in which several advanced capitalist 
countries are competing in the world market for industrial 
products, monopoly capital is the dominant form of capital, 
and the accumulation process has reached such maturity that 
capital export is an outstanding feature of world economic 
relations (Sweezy in Chilcote 2000, p. 33). As a 
consequence of these basic economic conditions, two further 
characteristics have developed- severe rivalry in the world 
market leading to international monopoly and the 
territorial division of the world among major capitalist 
powers (Sweezy in Chilcote 2000, p. 33).
Magdoff described neocolonialism as,
. . .the existence of considerable foreign 
direction over a nominally independent nation. In 
its narrowest sense, this means a high degree of 
influence over a country's economic affairs and 
economic policy by an outside nation or foreign 
business interests, usually entailing influence 
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over political and military policy as well. In 
addition, the term is used to suggest the 
predominance of the culture and values of the 
former colonial powers. (Magdoff 1978, p. 73)
The present period of imperialism is moving beyond 
neocolonialism to a more complete integration of peripheral 
states into the world economy (Tabb 2007). Under 
imperialism today, an area doesn't necessarily have to be a 
formal colony, but instead economic domination takes place. 
The domination occurs as a result of the dependence of the 
peripheral nation upon the core nation. This domination 
can exist in the form of a peripheral nation's dependence 
on the revenues generated from the sale of its few export 
products to a single core nation. It can also exist in the 
form of a peripheral nation's dependency on loans made 
available to them by a core nation, and the export of 
capital, which permits the core nation to receive interest 
and profits, thereby increasing their domestic surplus and 
strengthening their control over the economy of the 
peripheral nation. For the dependent nation, these 
relations represent an export of profits and interest, 
which removes part of the surplus generated domestically 
and leads to a loss of control over their productive
7
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resources. Additionally, multinational corporations invest 
in industries in the peripheral nation, causing the 
industries to become dependent upon the technology and 
continued investment by these corporations in order to 
modernize and expand production (Dos Santos in Chilcote 
2000, p. 272-274).
The competition that develops between the capitalist 
powers is balanced with the desire to create order and 
harmony over large territory for the purpose of economic 
gain. Thus the capitalist states are not just looking to 
receive tribute from a colonized territory, as in earlier 
examples of imperialism, but instead are seeking to 
organize the socio-economic life of the new territory to 
the benefit of the imperial state (Biel 2000, p. 8) .
Capitalist expansion is what propels the geographic 
extension of the economic system to new regions of the 
world. Once capitalism has expanded into a region, if that 
region is not capitalist already, the imperial nation seeks 
to transform the economies in the region away from its 
traditional pre-capitalist arrangement into capitalism. 
This is done in order for the new area to be receptive to 
capitalist expansion, which will benefit the imperial 
nation (Howard and King in Chilcote 1999, p. 24). This is 
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done through the assertion of modernization and all of its 
supposed benefits for the colonized region.
Magdoff tells us that imperialism would not have been 
possible without the prior phase of colonialism, and that 
colonialism actually helped to establish the conditions 
necessary for imperialism to flourish.
Colonialism, considered as the direct application 
of military and political force, was essential to 
reshape the social and economic institutions of 
many of the dependent countries to the needs of 
the metropolitan centers. Once this reshaping 
had been accomplished, economic forces- the 
international price, marketing, and financial 
systems- were by themselves sufficient to 
perpetuate and indeed intensify the relationship 
of dominance and exploitation between mother 
country and colony. (Magdoff 2003, p. 109)
Some countries, however, which already have suitable social 
and economic institutions come under the economic 
domination of capitalist powers without ever going through 
the colonial phase (Magdoff 2003, p. 109).
Once colonies are integrated into the circuits of 
capitalist exchange there becomes less of an incentive for
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the core nation to maintain external political control and 
imperialist domination can take on the form of extra- 
economic or economic means of control (Howard and King in 
Chilcote 1999, p. 31) . Extra-economic mechanisms of 
control which may be utilized by the core nation include 
military threat or occupation, providing military or 
economic aid, or constructing a network of military bases 
abroad. Economic control may be in the form of loans from 
core nations, and business firms making investments in the 
periphery. These forms of economic imperialism are 
referred to as characteristics under finance capital or the 
export of capital.
Magdoff offers an explanation as to why there is an 
upsurge of capital exports by core nations associated with 
modern imperialism. Magdoff writes, that "the tie between 
the export of capital and imperialist expansion is the 
obvious need of investors of capital for a safe and 
friendly environment" (Magdoff 2003, p. 95). When there is 
more than one industrialized state, a rivalry is created in 
foreign trade and this rivalry results in competition for 
preferential markets. This rivalry between core nations is 
a motivation for them to invest abroad.
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The desire to control pricing by large firms makes the 
ownership of raw materials of primary importance. Advanced 
capitalism is based upon industries which require 
substantial new supplies of raw materials, such as oil. 
Oil requires not only large amounts of capital for 
exploration and development of foreign sources, but also 
loan capital to enable peripheral nations which contain 
these sources to construct the needed transportation and 
public utility facilities. With the maturation of 
financial institutions comes the means for mobilizing 
capital more easily. As giant corporations emerge, their 
ability and desire to control markets provides a major 
incentive for the expansion of capital abroad (Magdoff 
2003, p.95). Magdoff writes,
The impetus to invest abroad arises out of the 
competitive struggle among giant corporations. 
The ownership of raw materials is of strategic 
importance in the push for the control over 
process and the need to control and expand 
markets is a major spur and incentive for capital 
export. (Magdoff 2003, p. 103)
The increase in the export of capital in the form of direct 
investment in and loans to the peripheral nations is 
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another way for core nations to maintain influence and 
domination over the economies and politics of those 
peripheral states.
Periphery nations are able to build up and improve 
upon their infrastructure from the investments and loans 
being made in the imperialist phase. However, because the 
base for these investments lies within the core nation, the 
economic benefits are brought back to the core nation 
rather than remaining within the periphery nation to be 
reinvested for growth. Additionally, foreign contractors 
are often hired for these projects paid for by the loans 
and investment funds from core nations. Therefore the 
loans end up as income to the core nations in two ways: 
first through the direct flow of money that comes back to 
them when the contractors are paid for out of the loan 
money; and secondly in the form of interest payments, which 
the peripheral nation makes to the core nation lenders. The 
core nation benefits immensely from this relationship and 
will use the persuasive diplomatic or military power of its 
state to influence the periphery nation into political and 
economic decisions favorable itself (Howard and King in 
Chilcote 1999, p. 31+). This is how new imperialist 
relationships utilizing economic domination arise under the 
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new imperialism of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. This form of economic domination, enforced and 
continued through use the persuasive diplomatic and 
military power of its. state, has been typical of British 
and U.S. policy in the Middle East.
The subjugated nation's political and social power 
structure helps to sustain the imperialist relations once 
established there. Imperial powers may seek to transform 
the traditional economic arrangements in an area to better 
suit their need for capital expansion, but they will also 
utilize the class system in place for their benefit. 
"Imperialism is unwilling to reform the land system because 
its rule typically depends upon the support of the colonial 
landlord class, both native and foreign" (Sweezy in 
Chilcote 2000, p. 43). There is a class of people in the 
subjugated area who benefit from the imperial relationship, 
and therefore will work with the capitalist power in order 
to perpetuate the economic and political’ arrangements under 
imperialism.
In the most general terms, there are three 
constituents of the ruling class in these 
countries: large landowners, business groups 
whose affairs are interrelated with foreign 
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business interests, and businessmen with few or 
no ties to the foreign business community...none of 
them has a strong motive to sponsor the kind of 
structural economic changes that would be 
required for an independent economy. (Magdoff 
2003, p. Ill)
Therefore, the classes within the society of the subjugated 
nation who profit from the imperialist relations do little 
to nothing to reform the government or economy of their 
nation in order to remove the imperial power from influence 
there because they benefit from the continuation of that 
relationship. This is true in rentier economies in which 
the recipients of the rents, or externally generated 
revenues such as those derived from the sale of a single 
commodity resource such as oil, benefit enormously.
Because the state's economy is not based upon the domestic 
population's surplus production, but rather upon the income 
derived from the commodity export, which is then 
distributed amongst the population in various ways, 
participation by the local population in the growth of the 
economy and political process is limited. There is little 
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motivation to alter the arrangement in favor of a more 
democratic system.1
1 See chapter five for further discussion of the rentier 
economy, its connection to imperialism and the relationship 
between Middle Eastern nations and Western capitalist 
powers.
Though these subjugated countries are politically 
independent, they continue to be economically dependent in 
many ways on the imperial power. This poses a problem, 
however, due to the instability of the power structure of 
the former colonies.
In many colonies, the dominant power had in the 
past disrupted the traditional ruling groups and 
destroyed their political power. In addition, 
the mother countries created and sponsored elites 
which were psychologically and economically 
dependent on the foreign rulers. (Magdoff 2003, 
p. 112)
During the time of colonialism, this was an effective and 
relatively inexpensive way to keep a nation within the 
empire of the dominant state. This arrangement poses a 
problem from the perspective of the both the core and 
peripheral states. For the peripheral nation it hinders 
their autonomous political and economic development.
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Magdoff explains the weakness in this arrangement for the 
peripheral nation "was that it prevented the emergence of 
the self-reliance and strength needed by any one sector to 
take power in its own name and reshape the economy for its 
own purposes" (Magdoff 2003, p. 112). For the core nation 
it creates a situation in which more direct applications of 
power must be used in order to create a stable political 
and economic environment for investment. Therefore, the 
retention of influence and control by the metropolitan 
centers in the post colonial period has required special 
attention by the states of the capitalist powers. The 
techniques used fall into several categories: 1) where 
possible, formal economic and political arrangements are 
used to maintain former ties. These include preferential 
trade agreements and maintenance of currency blocs; 2) 
manipulation and support of the local ruling groups with 
the goal of keeping the influence of the metropolitan 
center and preventing internal social revolution; 3) 
establishing influence and control over the direction of 
economic development, and as much as possible, over 
government decisions affecting the allocation of resources 
(Magdoff 2003, p. 112).
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Magdoff states that the roots of imperialism are to be 
found in the expansive drive of each advanced capitalist 
nation to operate on a world scale, the development of 
monopoly, and the national rivalries associated with the 
needs of advanced economies with monopolistic structures. 
( (Magdoff 2003, p. 105) However, as capitalist enterprise 
searches out export markets, the overseas areas often do 
not have enough goods to offer in exchange. As a result, 
many of the countries which buy from industrialized 
countries fall into debt, since their imports tend to 
exceed their exports. Under these conditions the need for 
loan capital from the metropolitan centers increases and 
capital exports become an important means to the 
continuation of export of goods. (Magdoff 2003, p. 94) 
This situation will continue because, according to Magdoff, 
. . .given a chance to make additional profits
abroad at a higher marginal rate, the 
entrepreneur will grab at it, providing that the 
politics of the foreign country is friendly to 
foreign investment and to the withdrawal of 
profits from that country. (Magdoff 2003, p. 103) 
In many cases, imperialist domination forces the 
privatization of state enterprises, often selling them to 
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foreign investors from the core countries. Core governments 
demand policies such as liberalization, opening local 
markets to transnational capital, lowering taxes on 
capital, and a smaller role of government through 
deregulation of markets (Tabb 2007).
Thus peripheral states have been reorganized in 
form and function by the global economic 
governance institutions to maximally extract 
locally produced surplus and allow its 
appropriation by foreign capital and its local 
collaborators. (Tabb 2007)
Because monopoly capital needs to expand abroad, it 
requires the assistance and protection of the state (Sweezy 
in Chilcote 2000, p. 76). The impact of imperialism on the 
state of the core nation is the need for a strong 
centralized government ready and able to rule over distant 
territories, to direct the activities of the military, and 
to solve complex economic problems, all resulting in an 
increase in the power and function of the state (Sweezy in 
Chilcote 2000, p. 41). Magdoff sees the role of the 
government in imperialism as neither an initiator of 
imperialism, nor as a potential agent for the abolition of 
imperialism. He states the two extremes are:
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. . . 1) those who see the government as merely 
the direct servant of large corporations and 
banks, and 2) those who see government as an 
independent force that arbitrates conflicting 
interests and has wide freedom of choice in 
setting policy. (Magdoff 2003, p. 107)
Instead, the functions of government in advanced societies 
result in the development of a political structure with 
responsibilities adapted to maintaining political power 
(Magdoff 2003, p. 107). Because of this a government may 
or may not be responsive to the needs of particular firms 
or industries. The actions of government will be 
influenced
. . . by their own sense of what is best suited
to keep themselves in power. Even a political 
regime responsive to the pressures of a 
particular industry or firm will... withstand such 
pressure in the overall long-term interest of the 
class, or classes, it relies on to remain in 
power. (Magdoff 2003, p. 107)
In order for a political regime to retain its political 
power it must have a successful economy. The ultimate test 
of a government's competence, or its ability to achieve its 
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political and military goals, is a successful economy. 
However, that economic success rests on the success of big 
business and big finance (Magdoff 2003, p. 108).
Magdoff argues that we must keep in mind, in light of 
the limited alternatives open to political regimes, two 
significant developments that prepared the way for the new 
imperialism. "The internal conflicts among competing 
vested interest groups within the Great Powers became 
resolved in favor of the needs of large-scale industry and 
the financiers of these industries", and "the successful 
development of large-scale industry is associated with 
increasing concentration of power" (Magdoff 2003, p. 107- 
108). Therefore, a later government has to continue to 
pursue similar paths, even when no longer party to previous 
conflicts, in order to provide a comfortable environment 
for industrialist and bankers, "an environment that would 
stretch over as much of the world as these interest groups 
need to operate in" (Magdoff 2003, p. 108). So in order 
for a government to maintain its political power it must 
maintain a successful economy, and in order to do so, it 
must, in many cases, cater to the interests of large 
corporations and financial institutions.
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The connection linking the economic and political
relationships of the monopoly firm or corporation, and the 
state in imperialism is important. These giant 
corporations must gain control over the sources of raw 
materials. Magdoff writes, "Ownership of and control over 
raw material supplies is, as a rule, an essential 
prerequisite for the ability of a leading firm or group of 
leading firms to limit new competition and to control 
production and prices of the finished products" (Magdoff 
2003, p. 42). The history of the oil industry is a classic 
example of this. As the age of formal colonies ended, what 
became important to both the corporations and the states 
under which those firms were associated, was to be able to 
hold on to as many of the economic and financial benefits 
of the former colonies as possible. This meant the 
continuation of economic and financial dependency of former 
colonial states on the metropolitan centers (Magdoff 2003, 
p. 46). The economic needs of these firms became enmeshed 
with the politics of the states to which they are 
associated, according to Magdoff, in several ways.
a) The United States has firms which are large 
enough to have, or be able to obtain, sufficient 
capital to develop necessary technology and take 
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advantage of preempting the field in other 
countries, b) United States firms are supported 
in this technological lead by huge government 
grants of research and development. c) These 
same firms have had experience in international 
operations; either on their own or in cooperation 
with the United States government, in the process 
of the latter's stretching its various military 
and foreign activities around the globe. (Magdoff 
2003, p. 50)
For Magdoff, the essential issue in imperialism is the 
nature of control and behavior in business, and the 
government's response to the operational needs of business. 
Magdoff states, "The decisive issues are...the controls 
business firms desire in order to manage world production 
and prices for the sake of greater profits" (Magdoff 2003, 
p. 52), The monopolistic firm attempts to achieve 
domination and control over sources of supply and markets; 
the governments of the core states in which these firms are 
located attempt to create policies which allow this to 
happen.
Imperialism today has changed its form.
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The world economy is dominated by the activities
of advanced capitalisms and they control the 
institution of regulation. The rules they enact 
are largely designed to meet their interests and 
have been savagely disruptive in emerging 
markets, as is evident in IMF shock therapies and 
World Bank structural adjustment programs, which 
are often backed by threats of extra-economic 
coercion. (Howard and King in Chilcote 1999, p. 
36)
Therefore imperialism continues to exist today in a more 
disguised, yet equally aggressive and overt manner as the 
previous eras of imperialist domination characterized by 
pillage and plunder of colonial territory.
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CHAPTER THREE
HISTORY OF WESTERN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Capitalism began to change toward the end of the 
nineteenth century. Throughout most of the nineteenth 
century, the development of capitalism had been mainly 
built on competition between rival firms in national 
markets and, at least in principle, free trade between 
nations. But from about 1880, the mature economies of the 
principal states of Europe and the United States were 
dominated by gigantic industrial and financial monopolies. 
The national governments supported the existence of these 
powerful firms through the imposition of tariffs, the 
acquisition of colonies, and large-scale expenditure on 
armaments, increasingly discarding their commitments to 
laissez-faire and free trade policies (Heller 2006, p. 16) . 
Support from the state became indispensable to the pursuit 
of new markets. In each imperialist country, state policy 
became increasingly integrated with the economic strategies 
of the most powerful monopoly capitalists (Heller 2006, p. 
16). Late-nineteenth century imperialism was driven by 
the need to export increasing amounts of surplus capital in 
search of profitable investment. Major capitalist 
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financial institutions facilitated the export of capital 
through increasingly sophisticated credit operations 
(Heller 2006, p. 16). The effects of this economic policy 
began to be felt in the Middle East as European powers 
expanded their influence into the region. The long history 
of western involvement in the Middle East sheds light on 
the political motivations behind the relationship between 
the western powers and the Middle East.
From 1517 until the end of World War I, the Ottoman
Empire was the ruling power in the central Middle East. At 
its peak, the Ottoman Empire was both a European and a 
Middle Eastern power, stretching from southeastern Europe, 
through Anatolia, the Fertile Crescent in what is now Iraq, 
through the Hijaz region in what is now Saudi Arabia, the 
regions along the Mediterranean of what are now Syria, 
Lebanon, and Israel, into Northern Africa and parts of 
Egypt. The Ottoman Empire began a long period of 
transformation beginning in the seventeenth century with 
the penetration of European merchant capital into the 
empire, which caused a displacement of the Ottoman economy. 
The penetration of European manufactured goods into the 
empire and the eventual domination of Ottoman commerce by 
Europeans were facilitated by a series of commercial 
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treaties, know as Capitulations. Most of these agreements 
were modeled after the first agreement negotiated with 
France in 1536, which allowed French merchants to trade 
freely in Ottoman ports, to be exempt from Ottoman taxes, 
and to import and export goods at low tariff rates. 
Additionally, the treaty granted extraterritorial 
privileges to French merchants by permitting them to come 
under the legal jurisdiction of the French consul in 
Istanbul, and not subject to Ottoman-Islamic law (Cleveland 
2004, p. 50). These treaties had devastating effects on 
the Ottoman economy as well as long-term political 
implications.
With the end of the Napoleonic Wars of 1815, came the 
penetration of European commerce into the Middle East to an 
unprecedented extent. Because of the incursions of 
European commerce and capital, the formerly self-sufficient 
economies of the Middle East became integrated into the 
world economy. However, for the most part the Middle East 
became incorporated into the global economic system as a 
dependent region, as a supplier of raw agricultural 
commodities and a consumer of European manufactured goods 
(Cleveland 2004, p. 58).
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In the mid-1800's, following the Anglo-Turkish 
Commercial Convention of 1838, the process of British and 
other European expansion into the Ottoman economy 
increased. The Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838 
extended extraterritorial privileges to all foreign traders 
and abolished the state's protective tariffs and monopolies 
(Berberoglu 1999, p. 7). This led to a reversal in the 
import-export structure of the empire and led to the 
destruction of the textile industry in Ottoman Turkey.
Soon many other branches of Ottoman industry were affected, 
and by the late 1800's Ottoman industry was on the verge of 
collapse. This marked the end of industrialization in the 
manufacturing sector and the empire was instead relegated 
to raw materials production for the needs of a world 
economy dominated by Europe (Berberoglu 1999, p. 7). By 
destroying the native industry, Europe was able to turn the 
Ottoman Empire gradually into an "agrarian reserve of the 
expanding European capitalist economies" (Berberoglu 1999, 
p. 8). By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire 
had essentially become a semi-colony of the expanding 
Western powers.
By the mid 1920's the Western capitalist powers had 
divided up the Middle East amongst themselves to secure 
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trade routes, raw materials, and new markets for the 
expanding world economy controlled by Europe (Berberoglu k
1999, p. 9). The object was control over the oil needed to 
fuel their expanding capitalist economies.
Control over petroleum resources became the 
overriding focus of Western rivalry in the area 
and the main impetus for the Western powers to 
establish and maintain political and economic 
control over the region. (Berberoglu 1999, p. 9) 
Through the influx of foreign capital in search of raw 
materials at low prices, profitable investments for their 
capital, markets for their products, and the guarantee of 
safe lines of communication, Europeans were able to control 
banking, the means of transportation and communication 
through railways, ports and roads, the main services such 
as water, gas, electricity, and telephone, as well as 
mining and oil.
Persia, now Iran, became a major center for Western 
imperialist designs because of their rich oil resources. 
Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, described Persia as one of 
"the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out 
a game for the domination of the world" (Yergin 1991, p. 
136). Britain and Russia fought for influence over Persia 
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through concessions and loans and other tools of economic 
diplomacy. William Knox D'Arcy, a British capitalist, 
became the founder of the oil industry in the Middle East, 
when the British government decided to back his venture in 
Persia in order to balance against Russian influence in the 
region. On May 28, 1901, Shah Muzaffar al-Din signed the 
oil concession to D'Arcy good for sixty years, covering 
three-quarters of the country (Yergin 1991, p. 137). 
However, D'Arcy soon began to fall under financial 
difficulties, which worried the British as they feared 
losing control of the oil concession under control of a 
British venture. The British Admiralty did not want to 
lose the possibility of obtaining a source of secure 
supplies of fuel oil for the British fleet, and argued that 
British majority control in the concession should be 
maintained at all costs. The Admiralty asked D'Arcy, in 
regards to the concession, to allow for its acquisition by 
a British syndicate. Lord Strathcona was asked to become 
the head of a "syndicate of patriots" and the concession 
was arranged to be taken over by a firm called Burmah oil, 
founded by Scottish merchants in 1886. Burmah oil had 
concerns about whether or not Persia could be considered 
under British protection. The Foreign Office reassured 
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them that it could, thus was born British "profits and 
politics" inextricably linked to Persia and the growth of 
British and other Western nation's interest in Middle 
Eastern oil (Yergin 1991, p. 142).
Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after
World War I the map of the modern Middle East started to be 
drawn. In the drawing of these borders for new states, 
which had previously not existed in the region, the 
interests of some were served while those of others were 
ignored. Forces behind new ideas such as nationalism and 
self-determination were calling for the borders to be drawn 
to reflect the interests of some groups, while others, 
particularly the "Great Powers", or those European powers 
on the side of the Allies in WWI, were looking to serve 
their own interests in acquiring and maintaining natural 
resources, commodity acquisition, access to waterways and 
imperial holdings in the Middle East through the creation 
of a friendly or pliable political ally in the region.
World War I was entered into by the Great Powers of 
Europe, particularly Britain, France, and Russia, with the 
intention of gaining as much of the territory of the 
crumbling Ottoman Empire as possible. The agreements 
entered into during and after World War I by the British 
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with various leaders in Europe and the Middle East were 
done so with the intention of winning the war in order to 
gain the Ottoman territory for their own, whether through 
direct colonial rule or indirect economic and political 
influence via mandates and protectorates. Even after 
official colonialism came to an end, Western Powers 
continued to play a dominant role in determining the 
economic and political policies and future of the Middle 
East.
By 1922, the modern map of the Middle East was 
essentially drawn into existence. The interests of the 
European colonial powers, primarily Britain and France, 
were served by the settlement on the boundaries more so 
than those of the local populations. The series of 
conflicting agreements, including the recommendations of 
the De Bunsen Committee, the Husayn-McMahon 
Correspondences, the Sykes Picot Agreement, and the 
Fourteen Points for the League of Nations, made in regards 
to the former Ottoman territory in the Middle East have had 
lasting effects shaping the events of the region into the 
present day.
The British had wanted to maintain the status quo in 
terms of the territory of the Ottoman Empire prior to World 
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War I because it allowed them to guard the areas it saw as 
most vital to them for strategic reasons, such as southern 
Iraq, where they controlled the oil fields, and in Egypt 
where the Suez Canal served as the gateway to their Asian 
colonies, most importantly India. The British were able to 
control this territory with little challenge from other 
European Powers for the most part, through the continued 
existence of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of World War 
I, the Ottoman Empire was broken apart, and the balance of 
power now rested on the equitable parceling out of the 
former Ottoman territory to the Great Powers based on 
recognized geopolitical interests (Smith 1992, p. 39). In 
the immediate post war period, British officials sought to 
advance the strategic interests of Britain at the expense 
of their allies, rather than working within the former 
diplomatic boundaries of compromise to maintain balance of 
power and avoid conflicts among European powers.
The British cabinet appointed a special committee 
chaired by Maurice de Bunsen in April 1915 to explore 
options for defining potential areas of interest to Britain 
in the Middle East. The de Bunsen Committee delivered its 
report on June 30, 1915. It identified four potential 
options for the fate of the former Ottoman territory. The 
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option most favored by the British stipulated that the oil 
fields of Mosul would be under direct British control or 
influence and also took into account Britain's desire to 
build a railway from Haifa in Palestine to Baghdad and 
Basra in Iraq in order to increase the security of their 
empire in India and their oil fields in southern Iraq by 
creating a direct link between the Mediterranean and the 
Persian Gulf across the territory they controlled. France, 
under the committee's recommendations, would be given 
Syria, including Lebanon, from south of Damascus to 
southern Anatolia in order to compensate them for losing 
Palestine.
Throughout 1915, the Ottoman Empire was beginning to 
crumble from within due to internal revolts against the 
Sultan's rule and France was bearing the brunt of terrible 
trench warfare on the western front. The French could not 
directly protect their Middle Eastern interests and were 
alarmed at Britain's growing military involvement in the 
region. Within this context, in order to resolve the 
concerns about the post war division of Middle Eastern 
territories, France and Britain moved urgently ahead in 
negotiating the terms for the post war land settlements. 
Britain and France through their principle negotiators, Sir 
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Mark Sykes, the Assistant Secretary to the British War 
Cabinet, and Georges Picot, former French Consul-general in 
Beirut, began negotiations in December 1915. They drew up 
a secret treaty in which they divided up most of the Arab 
Middle East between them. The treaty remained secret, 
except to those who had a say or stake in its outcomes, 
including Britain, France, and Russia. The agreement 
recognized the long standing French claims to Syria by 
awarding France a large zone of direct control stretching 
along the Syrian coast from southern Lebanon into Anatolia, 
including Syria just west of the "districts" of Damascus, 
Homs, Hama, and Aleppo through northern Iraq, including 
Mosul, to the Iranian border, and gave France a sphere of 
exclusive indirect influence in the Syrian interior. 
Britain gained the right to exercise direct control over 
southern Mesopotamia and was granted a huge zone of 
indirect influence stretching from Gaza to Kirkuk, thus 
protecting the Baghdad-Basra line and establishing the 
linkage to the Mediterranean recommended by the De Bunsen 
Committee. In the areas of direct authority both Britain 
and France would have the right,
. . . to establish such direct or indirect
administration as they desire and as they think 
34
fit to arrange with Arab State or Confederations 
of Arab States. In the spheres of indirect 
influence, each would have priority of right of 
enterprise and local loans...and shall lone supply 
advisors or foreign functionaries at the request 
of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab 
States. (Smith 1992, p.48)
What became known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, ratified in 
April 1916, was one of the most controversial documents of 
the war.
These documents were created under the assumption that 
if a population, "more or less homogenous in language and 
religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of 
advice", could be protected from external aggression, and 
the European mandated government could keep internal 
violence under control, then the new state would, "speedily 
and spontaneously organize themselves into a democratic 
state, on modern lines" (Kedourie 1987, p. 41). And the 
European designers of these agreements presumed, or at 
least hoped, that the new states would also be open to 
continued European control of the resources that were 
necessary to their geo-strategic and economic interests.
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At the end of the War, in the face of a changed world 
pattern of power, Britain had four major concerns with 
respect to the future of the Middle East which they used as 
their basis for negotiating the terms of the peace 
settlements. Those concerns included the continued access 
to and defense of India, security for the oil fields, a 
stable regime bordering Mesopotamia where the bulk of their 
territory lay, and a buffer zone between British territory 
of interest and Bolshevik Russia. In addition to the 
desires of Britain, several other players arrived on the 
scene to exert their interests in the formation of a post 
war Middle East.
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the final 
settlement agreements reapportioned Ottoman Arab provinces 
and divided them into mandates. Britain received mandates 
for Iraq & Palestine, France the mandate for Syria. In 
April 1920, in drawing up the settlement, the Allies could 
have considered the new principle of self-determination but 
instead they chose to apply the principle only when it 
furthered their own interests or coincided with their 
sympathies. So instead of an "independent" Iraq and Syria, 
what came to be were the mandates, which were nothing more 
than nineteenth-century imperialism repackaged to give the 
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appearance of self-determination. The Treaty of Sevres 
created Iraq out of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, 
Baghdad, and Mosul that had little in common. By acquiring 
control over the new entity of Iraq through the mandate, 
Britain enhanced its position in the Persian Gulf, secured 
the approaches to India, and gained access to petroleum 
resources
By 1922 it was thought that the "Middle Eastern 
Question" had been answered by the division of territory 
into new political entities, being primarily overseen by 
the British, French, Russians, and Turkey. The settlement 
of 1922 was not a single act, agreement, or document, but 
rather was the design that emerged from many separate acts, 
agreements and documents. The partitioning of the Middle 
East came from documents such as a trade agreement signed 
by the Soviet Union and Britain in 1921. France and 
Britain partitioned the rest of the Middle East territory 
through such documents as France's League of Nations 
Mandate to rule Syria and Lebanon in 1922, Britain's League 
of Nations Mandate to rule Palestine including Transjordan 
in 1922, and the treaty of 1922 with Iraq which Britain saw 
to serve as approval of a Mandate to rule Iraq. Britain, 
France, and Russia each established states in their 
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respective spheres of influence in the Middle East, that 
had previously not existed, appointed persons to govern 
them, and drew boundaries between them. "As they had long 
intended to do, the European powers had taken the political 
destinies of the Middle Eastern peoples in their hands- and 
they did so by the terms of...the settlement of 1922" 
(Fromkin 1989, p. 560).
Britain's long time aspirations to annex new colonies 
in the Middle East had come to fruition too late, as 
Europeans could no longer pursue colonialism with adequate 
resources, and to a growing number of Europeans, 
imperialism seemed out of place in the modern age. In the 
first years of the war it had still seemed a viable 
possibility for Britain and other European nations to gain 
colonial holdings in the Middle East. However, Britain was 
able to commit itself to a presence in the Middle East only 
because Winston Churchill had made it seem possible to the 
British people that it could be done relatively 
inexpensively at a time when British subjects no longer saw 
the benefits of an empire, and rather viewed maintaining 
one as a costly drain on a society desperately in need of 
investing its resources in rebuilding itself after the war.
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In the years following the settlements, Britain came 
to govern the Middle East with little sense of direction, 
though the purpose in theory of the mandate system was to 
guide the local leaders and population through the process 
of nation-building and self-rule. The Middle East in many 
respects is today what it is because European powers wanted 
to reshape it, but Britain and France had, "failed to 
ensure that the dynasties, the states, and the political 
system that they established would permanently endure" 
(Fromkin 1989, p. 563). During and after World War I, the 
old order in the Middle East was destroyed, and to take its 
place, Britain and France, "created countries, nominated 
rulers, delineated frontiers, and introduced a state system 
of sort that exists everywhere else; but they did not quell 
all significant local opposition to those decisions" 
(Fromkin 1989, p. 563). As David Fromkin points out, "the 
events of 1914-1922, while bringing to an end Europe's 
Middle Eastern Question, gave birth to a Middle Eastern 
Question in the Middle East itself" where many people and 
nations are not only fighting over borders and boundaries, 
but the right to exist at all, as their needs and desires 
for autonomy were ignored and overlooked in the post war 
settlements in favor of putting into place a system that 
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would further the economic and geo-strategic interests of 
Britain and to some degree France, Russia, and the United 
States (Fromkin 1989, p. 563).
It was in this interwar period that the U.S. interests 
in the Middle East began to emerge. The growing 
involvement of the U.S. in the area was dictated by the 
region's oil wealth. In reaction to British dominance over 
world petroleum markets, U.S. oil companies began to 
prospect for oil in Saudi Arabia during the 1930's. During 
the Second World War, the Saudi monarchy entered into an 
exclusive economic and political relationship with the 
United States as a counter to British control over the 
surrounding Arab states. Half of all global oil production 
was concentrated in the Middle East, and State Department 
planners envisioned postwar expansion of U.S. interests 
into the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and Iran (Heller 
2006, p. 50).
It turned out that Saudi Arabia in particular had the 
world's largest oil reserves, and it was from Saudi Arabia 
and the other oil-producing states of the Middle East that 
the majority of new petroleum supplies for the postwar 
global market came. In the following decades, oil's 
relative cheapness led to the rapid transfer of the 
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industrialized economies in Europe and Asia from coal to 
oil. Control of this strategic commodity by the U.S. was 
critical to their dominance over the postwar global 
economy. Politically, the U.S. goal became to reduce 
British and French influence in the Middle East, while 
increasing its own (Heller 2006, p. 50). The decline of 
British imperialism facilitated the U.S. assuming a 
dominant role in the region. One essential component 
justifying the expanding U.S. influence was the pretext of 
containing Russian or communist influence (Heller 2006, p. 
50) .
Toward the end of World War II, Washington was able to 
acquire oil concessions from the Iranian government. U.S. 
defense of Iranian territorial integrity greatly reinforced 
their influence in the country at the expense of the USSR 
and Great Britain. Monarchist politicians in Iran looked 
to the U.S. to reorganize and equip the Iranian police and 
army and to plan the development of Iran's oil economy. 
The U.S. was on its way to superseding British influence in 
Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. Domestically the 
U.S. found that opposition to Russian communist influence
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in the region proved an effective factor in pursuit of this 
goal (Heller 2006, p, 51).2
2 Success in Iran and Turkey (U.S. president Truman 
committing a permanent force to the Mediterranean, the U.S. 
Sixth Fleet which dominates the Mediterranean to this day, 
in order to stop Soviet access to the Mediterranean through 
th2e straits of the Dardanelles) was part of the process 
that made the containment of Soviet ambitions the rationale 
for the emergence of Washington's sphere of influence in 
the Middle East (Heller 2006, p. 51) .
Western capitalist powers were seeking access to the 
primary materials of the third world at the lowest possible 
cost, while looking for profitable markets and investment 
opportunities. In the Post World War II period, radical 
nationalists in the newly independent states sought to 
raise the price of primary products, to use these products 
in state-directed development programs, and to restrict 
foreign imports and investments. This demand for economic 
autonomy threatened the U.S., which needed access to 
foreign raw materials, markets, and investment 
opportunities. As a result, the United States became 
increasingly entangled in the politics of Southeast Asia, 
the Middle East, and Africa (Heller 2006, p. 76). U.S. 
intervention in Lebanon (1958) and Iran (1953) and the 
restraint of its French and British allies during the Suez 
Crisis (1956) marked the active engagement of the United
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States in Middle East politics for the first time. By 
1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine promised that the U.S. would 
intervene to guarantee the security of Middle Eastern 
states threatened by Communist subversion. From this point 
on it was the U.S., not Great Britain, which would 
undertake the protection of Western access to oil in the 
Middle East (Heller 2006, p. 118). One such place was in 
Iran during the Cold War.
The U.S. was intimately involved with the Iranian 
government under the Shah from the 1950's until the 1979 
Revolution. The U.S. has had an ongoing interventionist 
policy with regards to the region based upon the need for 
capitalist expansion by U.S. corporations via the policies 
of the U.S. state. Military spending is encouraged and 
intervention abroad is also viewed as in line with meeting 
both political and economic objectives. Under Keynesian 
policies, military expenditure is 'safer' economically than 
other forms of government spending because it provides a 
way of injecting money into the economy without increasing 
production in the economy. The expansion is what propels 
the geographic extension of the capitalist system to new 
regions of the world. An example of this intervention is 
the U.S. involvement in Iran in the overthrow of the
43
Iranian Mosaddiq government and subsequent U.S. support of 
the dictatorship of the Shah. In this way, world security 
order, or security for capital accumulation was legitimized 
under the policies of the Cold War.
Many times dictators in ex-colonial countries have 
been supported by the United States to forestall or 
obstruct the emergence of regimes that might be less than 
sympathetic to purely economic exploitation. An example is 
the coup promoted by the CIA in Iran in 1953, which 
overthrew the democratically elected nationalist government 
of Dr. Mosaddiq when he attempted to nationalize Iranian 
oil. Under the pro-Western regime which followed under 
Shah Reza Muhammad Pahlavi, American companies strengthened 
their position at the expense of the Iranians and the 
British, who ruled Iranian oil through the UK-owned Anglo- 
Persian Oil Company that began operations in 1908. Soon 
thereafter, U.S. companies took a large share of the oil 
concession and the U.S. replaced Britain as the most 
influential foreign power. The State Department in the 
U.S. sought to force Great Britain to give U.S. companies a 
share of the lucrative Middle Eastern oil concessions. 
Before Mosaddiq nationalized Iranian oil, British-owned 
companies received 100% of the profits from oil. After the 
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1953 coup, which brought the Shah back into power, Iran 
reopened Iranian oil concessions, which U.S. companies 
received 40% of the former 100% British owned company 
(Shalom 1993). The British dominance in Iranian oil by the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was not restored to its previous 
dominance and was instead replaced by U.S. interests.
In October 1969, the Shah asked the U.S. to purchase 
more Iranian oil as a way to boost revenues. The Shah's 
request was rejected because a substantial portion of the 
profits from these purchases would go to non-American 
companies if Iranian oil was bought. If Saudi oil was 
purchased, the U.S. share would be larger (Shalom 1993). 
Instead of the U.S. pursuing a balanced economic 
relationship with Iran, and reciprocating the economic 
relationship in a way that was favorable to Iran's economy, 
the U.S pursued a policy that undoubtedly benefited the 
U.S. economically, though Iran received desired product and 
assistance in exchange. For 25 years, Iran served as a key 
U.S. ally in the Middle East region, and key consumer of 
expensive U.S. military hardware. The United States 
initiated its military assistance grant program to Iran in 
1950 and established a Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) to administer the program. In 1962, the two 
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missions were consolidated into a single military 
organization, ARMISH-MAAG, which remained active in Iran 
until the Islamic revolutionary regime came to power in 
1979. United States military assistance to Iran between 
1947 and 1969 exceeded US$1.4 billion, mostly in the form 
of grant aid before 1965 and of Foreign Military Sales 
credits during the late 1960s (Global Security 2006).
The financial assistance programs were terminated 
after 1969, when it was determined that Iran, by then an 
important oil exporter, could assume its own military 
costs. Thereafter, Iran paid cash for its arms purchases 
and covered the expenses of United States military 
personnel serving in the ARMISH-MAAG and TAFT programs. 
Iran depended on the United States for security assistance, 
to the mid-1970s, when the government-to-government Foreign 
Military Sales program dominated other issues. Arms 
transfers increased significantly after the 1974 oil price 
rise, accelerating at a tremendous pace until 1979. From 
fiscal year 1950 through FY 1979, United States arms sales 
to Iran totaled approximately US$11.2 billion, of which 
US$10.7 billion were actually delivered (Global Security 
2006) .
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The Kissinger Accord in 1972 included designs to sell 
the Shah of Iran all the conventional weapons he could 
afford to buy, an initiative that was made before the 1973- 
1978 rise in prices of crude oil to a level high enough to 
make the Shah's regime the largest arms purchaser in the 
world by the U.S. lifting all normal restraints on the 
transfer of weapons to third world countries (Paolucci 
1991, p. 124). J.C. Hurewitz, professor of government and 
director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia 
University wrote an article entitled The Persian Gulf: 
After Iran's Revolution (New York, 1979) that states, 
Between 1945 and 1972 Iran had spent a total of 
$1.2 billion on arms imports. Over the next 
half-dozen years, the Shah entered into 
commitments for the purchase of more than $18 
billion worth of weapons, among them some of the 
most sophisticated systems in the inventories of 
the United States. (Hurewitz in Paolucci 1991, p. 
124)
Since high crude oil prices are useless or even 
antithetical to American economic interests, the sale of 
arms in mass numbers during this period was a way to get
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Iran's petrodollars to flow back to the U.S. economy via 
U.S. arms production corporations.
Iran, under the Shah, was America's number one arms 
customer, accounting for 25 per cent of the $71 billion in 
military orders placed by foreign governments under the 
Foreign Military Sales program between FY 1950 and FY 1977.3 
During a May 1972 visit to Iran by President Nixon, as part 
of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of relying on 'friendly' 
Third World powers to maintain regional stability in 
strategic areas, the Shah was given a virtual carte blanche 
to purchase anything in the U.S. arsenal except nuclear 
weapons.
3 "In the twelve years following the 1953 military coup, the 
United States poured over $1.2 billion in aid into Iran, 
almost half of which went to the Iranian Army, the Shah's 
evolving power base. Between Fiscal Year (FY) 1950 and FY 
1977, the United States supplied Iran with over $20 billion 
worth of arms, ammunition, training, and technical 
assistance under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and 
the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)."3 Between 1970 
and 1978, Iran spent $18 billion on U.S. arms under the FMS 
cash sales program. Iranian orders for new hardware were 
being placed faster than the weapons could be produced and 
delivered; therefore at the end of 1978 there was an 
outstanding balance of $12 billion worth of undelivered 
arms destined for Iran.(IranSource. Institute for Policy 
Studies. 1979. Washington. Nov. 1, 2006.
http://www.irvl.net/USMI.htm.)
U.S. support of the Shah in Iran was part of Cold War 
policy to maintain stability in the Middle East, as well 
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keep a western-friendly power in place in an oil rich 
nation to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of 
Iranian oil. Since the Shah in Iran was overthrown by the 
1979 Revolution, leading to a new Islamic government, U.S. 
policies towards Iran have not been favorable to Iranian 
interests because Iran was no longer willing to cater to 
western imperialist interests. Both the U.S. government 
and U.S. firms incurred indirect costs as a result of the 
Iranian cancellations. When student militants in Tehran 
seized hostages at the US Embassy that year, Washington cut 
off diplomatic and economic relations with Iran, imposing 
comprehensive sanctions. U.S. oil companies have not been 
able to return to the country since then, but European and 
Asian companies have large and growing operations in Iran, 
especially in the oil and gas sector, leading to new and 
potentially explosive international rivalries. Iran 
continues to be a source of imperial rivalry over 
competition for investments. The case of Iran is an 
example of how the policies of the U.S. towards Iran are 
preventing growth for U.S. companies and are in conflict 
with other capitalist nations.
During the 1980's, the U.S. pursued a policy of 
"balance of power" with Iran and Iraq so as not to allow 
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one or the other to gain the position of the dominant power 
in the region or exert too much influence over the region, 
especially in terms of control over oil resources. The 
Reagan administration announced its intention to continue 
defending the free flow of Middle East oil, by whatever 
means necessary. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the 
U.S. sold weapons and gave support in the form of 
intelligence and aid to both sides so that neither Iran nor 
Iraq could achieve a clear victory in the conflict, as well 
as to discourage both sides from accepting aid or support 
from the Soviet Union. Between 1985 and 1986 the U.S. was 
secretly providing arms and intelligence to Iran, via 
Israel transferring vast quantities of U.S.-origin weapons 
to Iran, resulting in the Iran-Contra Scandal (Shalom 1993, 
P- 3) •
Under the Carter Administration, the U.S. removed Iraq 
from its list of countries supporting terrorism and began 
to provide $500 million in annual commodity credits, and 
another $500 million in Export-Import Bank guarantees for 
an oil pipeline (Richman 1991, p. 7). The Reagan 
Administration continued to encourage Arab financial 
assistance to Iraq and urged American allies not to sell 
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weapons to Iran. In 1984, Reagan resumed diplomatic 
relations with Iraq.
That same year Iran was declared a supporter of 
international terrorism, thus making them ineligible for 
various forms of U.S. foreign assistance. On October 29, 
1987 President Reagan signed Executive Order 12613, which 
banned U.S. imports of Iranian crude oil and all other 
Iranian imports because of Iran's support for terrorism and 
its threat to maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf.
Iraq emerged from the Iran-Iraq war with a narrow 
victory on August 20, 1988. The various forms of aid via 
the U.S. had a direct effect on Iraq's ability to hold out 
against Iran's offensive. At the end of the war, Iraq had 
a huge military establishment which led Sadaam Hussein to 
believe he was the leader of the Arab world.
The U.S. intervened in Iraq as the leader of the 
coalition to protect Kuwaiti oil during Operation Desert 
Storm, which began with an allied attack on January 17, 
1991. During the first Gulf War, the invasion of Kuwait, 
and the possibility of defeating Iraq, offered the U.S. the 
perfect opportunity to establish its dominance over the 
oil-rich Middle East. It was to become the moment of 
assertion by President George H. W. Bush of a New World
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Order based on U.S. leadership. As the single world power 
in the post-Cold War, the U.S. would assert its dominance
by organizing a multilateral military and political 
coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The gain for the U.S.
was immense; its dominance over the Middle East and its 
petroleum resources was now incontestable. Likewise, its 
post-Cold War role as a global hegemon was also confirmed 
(Heller 2006, p. 283).
Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. pursued a 
new policy towards Iraq and Iran known as "dual 
containment". Under this policy sanctions were implemented 
in an attempt to isolate Iran economically and 
diplomatically in order to force a regime change, in hopes 
that a more pro-U.S. regime sympathetic to U.S. strategic 
interests in the region would be installed. On March 5, 
1995, the U.S. oil company Conoco signed a $1 billion deal 
to develop Iranian oil fields, the first such contract 
since the 1979 revolution, but Conoco backed out of the 
deal after Washington voiced objections. On March 15,
1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957,
banning U.S. investment in Iran's energy sector. On May 6,
1995 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12959, 
banning U.S. trade and investment in Iran. On August 4, 
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1996 President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 
(ILSA) into law, which imposes at least two of six 
sanctions on foreign companies that make an investment of 
more than $20 million in one year in Iran's energy sector.
The United States in the 1990's was pursuing the oil 
and gas reserves of the area of the Caspian Sea and the 
regions to the east in Central Asia and further into the 
Middle East. While they do not quite match those of the 
Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia to the south, they are 
enormous nonetheless. Possible oil reserves in the Caspian 
basin and the region to its east are calculated in excess 
of 200 billion barrels. The area has in addition 40 
percent of the world's proven natural gas reserves. With 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, the region was split into 
the independent states of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan (Heller 2006, p. 
311). The big American oil companies interested in the 
region- Chevron, Union Oil of California, Amoco, and Exxon- 
tried to acquire concessions and to make pipeline deals in 
the region immediately following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, but they were initially refused. In 1997, the 
Clinton administration began to deploy troops and establish 
bases in several of the ex-Soviet republics. The Russian 
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government consented to the American intrusion, despite 
deep misgivings (Heller 2006, p. 311). The U.S. military 
presence then facilitated the closing of several important 
oil and pipeline deals.4
4 Pipeline agreements included one by Chevron running from 
Kazakhstan to Baku to the Russian Black Sea port of 
Novorossiisk. The project was linked to the American 
acquisition of landing and basing rights in Romania, 
Bulgaria, and especially, Kosovo in the ex-Yugoslavia. 
Since 1999, the Americans had created an enormous base in 
Kosovo called Camp Bondsteel. Another pipeline from Baku 
through Georgia and Armenia to Turkey's deep water 
Mediterranean port of Batumi took form. A third still 
unrealized oil and gas pipeline would run from Turkmenistan 
through Afghanistan to Pakistan, serving the burgeoning 
South and East Asian energy markets. None of these 
pipelines were secure. The initial American military 
buildup in the former Soviet republics could only be 
regarded as preliminary to a much larger operation. (Heller 
2006, p. 312)
The American intervention in Central Asia was part of 
an overall strategy to assure control over the oil-rich 
Middle East. The new military bases in the ex-Soviet 
republics were not as large, however, as the growing 
military capacity of CENTCOM in the Persian Gulf. At the 
end of the Gulf War, American military bases in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, adjacent to Iraq, were reinforced. In 
the course of the 1990's, American bases were established 
in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, 
and Turkey. The Americans pre-positioned enormous 
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quantities of military equipment in the installations, and 
large numbers of U.S. warships operated in the Persian 
Gulf, Arabia Sea, and Red Sea (Heller 2006, p. 312).
With the dawn of a new administration, the U.S. 
presence in the Middle East continues to grow. The current 
Bush administration has succeeded in overthrowing the Iraqi 
government through the Iraq War beginning in 2003. Several 
reasons for the invasion of Iraq have direct connections to 
imperialism as defined by the classical Marxist theorists. 
The first being that the interests of U.S. corporations are 
the interests of the U.S. government, because under the 
stage of monopoly capital, state and corporate interests 
are one in the same. The invasion of Iraq with subsequent 
overthrow of Sadaam Hussein was related to control of 
petroleum resources and pipeline routes. The installation 
of military bases throughout the region, including Iraq as 
well as several areas in central Asia, will ensure the 
protection of U.S. corporations desiring to build an oil 
pipeline that would circumvent any passage of the pipeline 
through Iran, since U.S. corporations are banned from 
investing in the Iranian energy sector by ILSA, which on 
August 3, 2001, President G.W. Bush signed the ILSA 
Extension Act into law. The occupation of Iraq also has 
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direct benefits for U.S. corporations in the fields of 
armaments, oil, engineering, and the financial industry.
After World War II, the U.S. emerged as the dominant 
capitalist economic power and recognized that in order to 
maximize its interests, the existing system had to change 
in order for its own economy to continue to grow and 
develop in the changed economic and political conditions of 
the world after the war. U.S. President Franklin 
Roosevelt argued, 'the structure of peace demands and will 
get equality of all people. Equality of peoples involves 
the utmost freedom of competitive trade.' This definition 
of equality meant that countries (that is, industrial ones) 
should have "access, without discrimination and on equal 
terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the 
world...needed for their economic prosperity" (Biel 2000, p. 
58). During the Cold War these changes for capitalist 
growth were framed in discussions and arguments in favor of 
security. "International politics tends to speak of 
security as if it were economically neutral, but in the 
real world security always creates conditions for the 
elites to enjoy their wealth" (Biel 2000, p. 57). The 
underlying purpose of the international system was not 
solely security, as in defense of sovereignty and interests 
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from aggressor nations itself, but security for capitalist 
exploitation.
For the United States, free markets and free trade are 
key priorities for national security. The economic 
policies of other countries, including their legal and 
regulatory policies, tax policies, financial systems, 
fiscal policies, and what the U.S. refers to as 'free 
trade' is all considered part of the U.S. national security 
concerns. Free trade, however, refers to other nations 
opening their markets to the U.S. One long term objective 
of U.S. foreign policy is a world, "in which all countries 
have investment-grade credit ratings that allow them access 
to international capital markets and to invest in their 
future" (Research Unit for Political Economy 2003, p. 72) 
Once way the U.S. is attempting to achieve this is by 
influencing multilateral institutions such as the IMF and 
World Bank to streamline their policies and conditions for 
lending, insisting that their development assistance be 
tied to measurable goals and benchmarks, and that nations 
receiving development aid from them have their development 
be predicated to openness of the inflows and outflows of 
capital (Research Unit for Political Economy 2003, p. 72). 
This is currently the case in Iraq, where Iraq's ability to
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obtain assistance from the IMF in the form of debt 
reduction and loans has been directly tied to the IMF 
pressing legislators in Iraq to pass a petroleum law 
privatizing their oil industry.
One of the long term goals for the U.S. in the Middle 
East is to reconstruct not only Iraq, but the other nations 
of the region into stable capitalist democracies friendly 
to both the United States and Israel. "This audacious U.S. 
plan was born out of overwhelming military strength 
combined with a growing sense of economic vulnerability" 
(Heller 2006, p. 321). American military power and control 
of Middle East oil would enable the U.S. to reassert its 
declining economic supremacy while bolstering the dollar. 
Massive increases in military and reconstruction 
expenditure in the form of contracts to American companies 
would help to reawaken the U.S. economy out of a recession 
(Heller 2006, p. 321).
One way the U.S. has been able to restrict the 
development of nations with coveted natural resources 
greatly needed by the U.S for its own continued economic 
growth is to impose economic sanctions on them when they 
are unwilling to bend to the demands of the U.S. foreign 
policy agenda. Economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq by 
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UN Security Council Resolution 661, passed in. August 1990. 
As .long as sanctions remained in place, no foreign 
investment could take place in Iraq, nor could 
rehabilitation of Iraq's oil industry. However, as long as 
the sanctions were in place, it also meant that the 
expansion of Iraqi oil production was impossible. The 
United States Department of Energy said:
As of early January 2002, the head of the UN Iraq 
program, Benon Sevan, expressed 'grave concern' 
at the volume of 'holds' put on contracts for oil 
field development, and stated the entire program 
was threatened with paralysis. According to 
Sevan, those holds amounted to nearly 2000 
contracts worth about $5 billion, about 80% of 
which were 'held', by the United States.
(Research Unit for Political Economy 2003, p. 50) 
So while the U.S. sees access to Iraq's oil supplies as 
vital to its own economic and security interests, only 
through the direct benefit to U.S. corporations via 
contracts and concessions in the oil industry that the U.S. 
wants this access to take place.
Sanctions were imposed on Iran in October of 1987, 
when President Reagan signed Executive Order 12613, which 
59
banned U.S. imports of Iranian crude oil and all other 
Iranian imports. Sanctions on Iran were extended by 
President Clinton when he signed Executive Order 12957 on 
March 15, 1995, banning all U.S. investments in Iran's 
energy sector, Executive Order 12959 on May 6, 1995 banning 
U.S. trade and investment in Iran, and by signing into law 
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act on August 4, 1996, which also 
sanctions foreign companies if they are to invest in Iran's 
energy sector. President Bush extended the ILSA on August 
3, 2001 and renewed EO 12959 in March 2004. As long as the 
sanctions remain in place, U.S. corporations cannot invest 
in Iran.
In the post war era, the endemic violence capitalism 
generates as a system, with inherent conflicts, tended to 
be borne by those poorer nations who are excluded from the 
security that the rich enjoy. Because Iraq and Iran have 
been denied the security provided by economic dominance due 
to the poor state of their economy resultant of years of 
war and sanctions, they are targets for the core nations to 
exploit them economically. This is done by the core 
nations, primarily by the United States, but other nations 
with economic clout as well, such as the nations of Western 
Europe, Japan, China, Russia and India to a growing extent, 
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participating in a structural dominance of the world 
economy, having a commitment to dismantling the 
protectionist tools which developing nations employ to 
promote their industry, and a demand that nations of the 
periphery, such as Iraq and Iran, make available their raw 
materials and that they allow corporations from core 
nations the freedom to invest in their economies and 
repatriate the profits (Biel 2000, p. 58). Under these new 
economic demands of the capitalist powers, security is put 
forward as a valid reason for military involvement in many 
nations of the periphery.
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CHAPTER FOUR
WESTERN INVOLVEMENT IN THE OIL INDUSTRY
OF THE MIDDLE EAST
On May 28, 1901 William Knox D'Arcy, with the backing 
of the British government, signed the first oil concession 
in the Middle East with Iranian Shah Muzaffar al-Din. The 
Shah received twenty thousand pounds in cash, another 
twenty thousand pounds worth of shares, as well as 16 
percent of annual net profits, a term which was to be 
defined. In return, D'Arcy received a concession good for 
sixty years, covering three-quarters of the country (Yergin 
1991, p. 137). In 1905, D'Arcy partnered with Burmah Oil 
who created the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1909 as 
a subsidiary, in an agreement called the Concession 
Syndicate, inextricably linking British "profit and 
politics" in Persia (Yergin 1991, p. 142). This concession 
deal essentially gave away control of the oil reserves in 
Iran to Britain for the next 60 years. Britain at this 
time was changing its fuel source for the royal navy from 
coal to oil, and needed to ensure a cheap and sufficient 
supply of the new energy source. As oil discovery 
increased in the Middle East more concessions were to 
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follow. Concession deals were basically agreements that 
allowed foreign companies exploration and production rights 
for oil in a sovereign nation in exchange for royalty 
payments to the host nation. These concessions came to be 
viewed as a loss of sovereignty to many people in the host 
nations of the Middle East.
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, renamed the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1935 (and eventually the
British Petroleum Company (BP) in 1954) signed a new 
concession agreement with the Iranian government in 1933, 
which was a renegotiation of the terms of the D'Arcy 
concession of 1901. This new concession deal provided Iran 
with a modest increase in annual royalty payments from 16 
percent to 20 percent of the company's worldwide profits, 
and a guarantee of a minimum annual payment of £750,000.
In return, Iran agreed to extend the concession to 1993 
from its scheduled expiration date of 1961. This agreement 
did little to improve Iran's economic gain from its oil 
resources or to advance its claims to sovereignty over them 
(Cleveland 2004, p. 190).
Although Iran was never a formal colony, Iranian 
economic development had largely been controlled by 
European companies. Economic domination and imperial 
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manipulation characterized Britain's relationship with Iran 
up until 1950. The Iranian government was so displeased 
with the terms of the 1933 concession that they began to 
renegotiate revisions in the late 1940's. In 1950, the 
revisions were submitted to the Majlis and opposed by 
Muhammad Mosaddiq and the National Front, who called for 
the cancellation of the concession and the nationalization 
of the Iranian oil industry. In 1951, the Majlis passed 
the legislation nationalizing the oil industry and it 
invited Mosaddiq to become prime minister. In response to 
the passage of the oil nationalization law, the AIOC called 
for a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil. The British 
government endorsed the boycott, reinforced its naval 
forces in the Persian Gulf, and imposed economic sanctions 
on Iran. The United Stated joined the boycott in 1952, 
essentially preventing Iran from selling its oil on the 
international market and plunged the country into economic 
crisis by the almost total loss of oil revenues. Mosaddiq 
refused to compromise on the nationalization issue and 
severed diplomatic ties with Britain in October 1952. As 
the Iranian economy continued to plummet, the Tudeh Party, 
a leftist organization, was gaining strength. This gave a 
group of Iranian military conspirators a motivation to 
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overthrow Mosaddiq, which coincided with the goals of the 
U.S. and British governments to contain Soviet influence, 
and Mosaddiq was overthrown in a coup in 1953. The coup 
brought the return of the royal dictatorship, and a new oil 
arrangement which gave Iran a 50 percent share of the 
profits from petroleum. Diplomatic relations with Britain 
were restored in 1954, and the beginning of a close 
relationship with the U.S. as a provider of military and 
economic aid emerged. The Iranian government and the 
Western powers established an eight-company consortium from 
four nations (Britain, America, the Netherlands, and 
France) which succeeded in getting Iranian oil flowing once 
again under the National Iranian Oil Company.
In Saudi Arabia, the first oil concession was granted 
by Ibn Sa'ud in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of 
California (later reorganized as the Arabian American Oil 
Company, ARAMCO), which acquired the right to extract and 
transport whatever petroleum was found within its 
concession in exchange for the construction of a refinery 
and the payments of royalties amounting to four gold 
shillings per ton of crude oil. The terms of the 
concession were extremely favorable to ARAMCO. During the 
1950's, the concession agreements were modified so that
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Saudi Arabia, and most other Middle Eastern oil producing 
nations, received 50% of the profits from foreign 
companies. ARAMCO emerged as a giant multi-national 
corporation that controlled not only the exploration and 
extraction of Saudi oil, but also its refining, marketing, 
and pricing. The oil-producing countries had little say in 
the determining of prices or production levels of oil.
In 1934, Kuwait signed a concession agreement with 
Gulf Oil and AIOC, authorizing them to become equal owners 
in the concession known as the Kuwait Oil Company. 
Commercial oil exports began in 1946 generating an income 
in that year of $760,000. By 1953, oil revenues were $169 
million, and rose to $21.7 billion in 1980. Kuwait was 
dependent upon a foreign workforce to develop its petroleum 
industry and supporting infrastructure, as well as a source 
of technology and equipment that was used to extract the 
oil.
In 1925, Iraq, under Faysal's government, signed a 
seventy-five year concession with the firm that became the 
Iraq Petroleum Company. The agreement provided for Iraq to 
receive modest royalties at a specified sum per ton of oil, 
but excluded Iraq from having any ownership in the company. 
The Turkish Petroleum Company formed by British, French, 
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and Dutch interests discovered oil in Iraq near Kirkuk in 
1927. In 1928, the U.S entered the Middle East oil race 
when the Near East Development Corporation (NEDC) obtained 
an equity interest in Turkish Petroleum' and renamed it the 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1929. On July 31, 1928, 
nine months after the original discovery, a contract was 
signed giving Royal Dutch/Shell, Anglo-Persian, the French, 
and NEDC each 23.75 percent of the oil. The NEDC 
originally was made up of 5 companies, but later was 
equally divided between Standard of New Jersey (now Exxon) 
and Socony Vacuum (later Mobil, which merged with Exxon in 
1999). This far-reaching oil settlement was called the 
"Red Line Agreement" because the partners bound themselves 
through a "self-denying" clause not to engage in any oil 
operations with the territory of what used to be the 
Ottoman Empire (excluding the areas of Kuwait and Persia) 
except in cooperation with the other members of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company (Yergin 1991, p. 205).
The total control that Western-owned companies 
maintained over the production, marketing, and pricing of 
Middle Eastern oil was a constant reminder of the region's 
continuing dependence on the West. Arab nationalists 
increasingly argued against the imperialist nature of the 
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oil concessions in the region. Then in 1972, U.S. and 
Britain were excluded from the oil industry in Iraq by 
nationalization of the oil industry there. Companies from 
France, Russia, and China had obtained major contracts with 
the Iraqi government, but UN sanctions kept the contracts 
inoperable.
In order to gain a greater measure of control over 
pricing policies, representatives from five of the major 
oil producing countries- Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
and Venezuela- founded the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. A parallel group, the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), 
composed solely of Arab oil exporting nations was created 
in 1968. OPEC was founded in the Nasser era, and one of 
the principle goals of Nasserism was to break out of the 
constraints of postwar neocolonialism that was allowing 
Western powers to still manipulate the diplomatic and 
economic affairs of the Arab world. OPEC's immediate 
objective was to utilize the collective bargaining power of 
its member states to pressure Western oil companies to 
increase oil prices. As long as the world supply of oil 
was plentiful, OPEC had limited success in its efforts*to  
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change the policies and thinking of the oil companies 
(Cleveland 2004, p. 456).
Abundant low cost oil was the energy source that 
fueled the post World War II recovery of Europe and Japan, 
and assured the economic prominence of the United States. 
Western industrial economies depended upon oil based on the 
assumption that oil would always readily available and 
moderately priced. In 1972, Saudi Arabia was supplying 
21.6% of Europe's oil, and 13% of the world's total 
production of crude oil in 1973. Saudi Arabia's share of 
U.S. oil imports in 1973 was 8.1% (Cleveland 2004, p. 456). 
OPEC used the "oil weapon" to boycott oil sales to western 
nations and drive up prices during the October War in 1973 
by cutting back production. This led to increased 
participation by OPEC countries in the ownership of oil, 
including production operations, and involvement in 
refining, distributing, and marketing. Foreign oil 
companies continued to provide the technology and expertise 
on which producers still depended and their services were 
retained though lease-back arrangements and joint ventures 
with the national oil companies.
Concession deals between western corporations and the 
governments of oil-producing nations were the dominant form 
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of investment contracts used to develop the Middle Eastern 
oil industry during the greater part of the 20th century, 
until many nations began to nationalize oil production and 
move toward more state control of the oil industry. Today, 
the top six OPEC countries use service contracts instead, 
which allow the state to retain full authority over all 
production decisions and relegate the investing company to 
the role of contractor. No oil-producing nation in the 
Middle East has privatized its oil industry, and nations 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iran give only 
limited usage contracts to international oil companies for 
one or two years. However, Iraq under pressure from the 
international community including the United States 
government, the British government, the IMF, the U.S. oil 
lobby, and International Oil Companies (IOCs) are being 
asked to privatize their oil industry through the passage 
of a Hydrocarbon Law, which was delivered to the Iraqi 
Parliament on February 18, 2007.
The major component of the privatization law is the 
use of production-sharing agreements (PSAs), which are 
exclusive long-term deals that Iraq's unions compare to 
earlier concession agreements. While Iraqi leaders, such 
as Hassan Jumaa Awad, the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions
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President, believe that Iraqi manpower and international 
technology and expertise make a good match for developing 
the oil sector, but only on terms advantageous to Iraq. 
Awad stated, "It is possible to co-operate with oil 
companies through a service contract, for the development 
of the oil industry in the service of the Iraqi economy" 
(Jasiewicz 2007). The law under consideration now is the 
blueprint for foreign companies to explore, develop, 
produce, and sell Iraqi oil under exclusive contracts 
lasting up to 30 years. Most Iraqis favor continued 
control by a national company and the powerful oil workers 
union there strongly opposes de-nationalization. A recent 
poll commissioned by U.S. and British human rights groups 
found that 63 percent of Iraqis believed their oil industry 
should be developed by state companies and another 32 
percent indicated a strong preference for state control 
(Jasiewicz 2007). However, the Iraqi constitution of 2005, 
greatly influenced by U.S. advisors, contains language that 
guarantees a major role for foreign companies.
Production-sharing agreements are usually used by 
countries with reserves which are hard to gain access to, 
thus resulting in high extraction costs. The PSAs are 
generally applied in circumstances where there is a strong 
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possibility that oil exploration will be extremely costly 
or even fail. To offset the huge amount of risk in these 
investments, the contracting company is guaranteed a 
portion of the profits, if and when oil is extracted and 
sold. Most commonly in these agreements the portion 
remains very high until all development costs are 
amortized, which allows the investing company to recoup its 
investment expenditures and then be rewarded with a larger- 
than-normal profit margin for the remainder of the 
contract, which could extend up to 25 years. This type of 
agreement may be fair or necessary in a country that cannot 
generate sufficient investment capital on its own, where 
the exploration is difficult (as in cases of it being 
underwater or deep underground), where the reserves may 
prove to be very small, or where the ongoing costs of 
extraction are very high. None of these conditions, 
however, exist in Iraq, where huge reserves of easily 
accessible oil have been proven to exist, and the 
discoveries of more fields are likely. This is why nations 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and the United Arab 
Emirates do not use PSAs and instead pay the multinational 
corporations a fixed rate to explore and develop their 
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fields, after which all of the profits become state 
revenues (Schwartz 2007).
The Iraqi view of the PSAs is they are turning over 
the oil fields to foreign companies, giving them control 
over setting royalties, deciding production levels, and 
determining whether Iraqis get to work on their own 
industry. To many Iraqis the PSAs are a reflection back to 
times of imperialism in the region when the oil industry 
was dominated by foreign companies through concessions. If 
privatization is to be implemented and PSAs were enacted, 
Iraq would lose control over the amount of oil the country 
produced with the potential to substantially weaken OPEC 
influence on the oil market. The law would allow oil 
companies to repatriate all profits from oil sales, which 
substantially decreases the possibility that those profits 
would be reinvested into the Iraqi economy. The Iraqi 
government would not have control over oil company 
operations inside Iraq, and any disputes would be referred 
to international arbitration panels. Additionally, no 
contracts would be public documents and contracting 
companies would not be obliged to hire Iraqi workers 
(Schwartz 2007).
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Privatization of the Iraqi oil industry through the 
use of production-sharing agreements clearly serves the 
interests of foreign companies over those of Iraq, 
particularly those of American and British companies, as 
these two western powers hold the most influence over Iraqi 
governing decisions in their role as the leading occupying 
nations in Iraq. Western companies such as BP, Shell, 
Exxon, and Chevron, as well as smaller companies such as 
Addax Petroleum are in positions to gain the most from the 
passage of a law allowing production-sharing agreements. 
John Heavyside, business manager for BP in Iraq stated his 
support for PSAs saying,
. . .We want to take risks and get incentivised 
to perform better; service contracts don't really 
allow us to do that. It's what we all want, all 
the international companies here. Production­
sharing agreements offer a win-win situation. 
They are equitable and offer lucrative returns 
and benefits to both the state and investing 
companies. (Jasiewicz 2007)
To this Natiq al Bayati, director or reservoir and oil 
fields development in the Iraq oil ministry, replied, 
"International oil companies would prefer the PSC
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[production-sharing contract] but the political and 
economic culture and atmosphere in Iraq is not conducive to 
this contract" (Jasiewicz 2007). The political and economic 
culture in Iraq is not open to the PSAs most likely due to 
the years of sovereignty denied to them by western 
companies who had the backing of their governments during 
the era of concession contracts in the oil industry
Foreign oil companies see the potential for profits in 
Iraq since their production capacity has not been met for 
years due to the disruptive effects of the Iran-Iraq War in 
the 1980's, the years of UN economic sanctions following 
the Gulf War in 1991, and the infrastructure and political 
environment still needing to be rebuilt after the 2003 
invasion. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, Iraq possesses 115 billion barrels of 
proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world after 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Only about 10% of the country has 
actually been explored and there is reason to believe that 
with the introduction of more modern methods that have not 
been in effect in Iraq for many years, more oil could be 
discovered. A modest goal for Iraq's oil industry is 3.5 
million barrels per day; however from 1990 until the 2003 
invasion, Iraq averaged around 2.5 million barrels per day.
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An increase to the 3.5 million barrels per day level at the 
$30 per barrel price oil was getting prior to the invasion, 
created projected revenues at $40 billion per year 
(Schwartz 2007). With the introduction of large foreign 
oil companies contributing to the exploration and 
production efforts in Iraqi oil, these numbers are 
projected to grow even more.
To attract the large amounts of finance capital needed 
to restore and increase Iraqi oil production (somewhere in 
the range of $20 billion has been estimated) will be 
difficult to do as long as the security and stability in 
Iraq remains precarious. Therefore, the advocates of the 
PSAs in Iraq have been able to make an argument to justify 
their use stating that favorable PSAs are the only way to 
attract this level of investment under the current 
dangerous conditions. Due to the current conditions, few 
companies are willing to invest in Iraq; however, some have 
argued that if order is restored Iraq would have no problem 
attracting large amounts of finance capital to develop 
reserves that could be in excess of $10 trillion, therefore 
nullifying the need for PSAs (Schwartz 2007). Based on 
leaked information to the media from the petrochemical law 
under consideration, journalists have reported that the law 
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contains extremely favorable provisions for oil companies, 
in which they would be entitled to 70 percent of profits 
until development expenses were amortized and 20 percent 
thereafter. This would guarantee them at least twice the 
typical profit margin over the term of the contract 
(Schwartz 2007) .
There is a lot of pressure being placed on the Iraqi 
government to pass this Hydrocarbon privatization law. 
That pressure is coming from several sources including 
international oil companies, studies and recommendations 
from the British government, the U.S. occupation, and IMF 
reform mandates. In 2004, BP, Chevron, Exxon, Total and 
ENI employed the services of Washington-based lobbyists the 
International Tax and Investment Centre. The ITIC produced 
a document which concluded that PSAs were the only 
investment option for Iraq (Jasiewicz 2007). The Foreign 
Office on behalf of the British government delivered the 
ITIC report to Iraqi officials. The British ambassador to 
Iraq formally sent the "road-map" study on the Iraqi oil 
industry to the then Iraqi minister of finance, which 
recommended the Iraqi government sign long-term production­
sharing agreements with foreign oil companies (Webb 2007). 
Because Iraq is still under U.S. occupation, with the 
77
presence of U.S. and multinational troops and private 
security contractors as a reminder, pressure is placed on 
the Iraqi government to ensure the success of the Western 
backed oil plans. Because the U.S. military would be 
needed to protect U.S. corporate interests, especially in 
oilfields leased to U.S. companies by a compliant Iraqi 
government, troop presence in the form of permanent 
military bases would be the guardian of U.S. corporate 
interests in the Iraq for the life of the contracts, over 
the next twenty-five to thirty-years. Additionally, the 
International Monetary Fund is pressuring the Iraq to adopt 
the program when the IMF was made a key player in Iraqi oil 
policy.
Through loans in the 1980s and reparations for 
his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam 
accumulated $120 billion in external debt, the 
largest per capita debt in the world and a 
potentially insurmountable obstacle to economic 
recovery, even in oil-rich Iraq. One option 
available to the new government was to declare 
this debt 'odious', a technical term in 
international law referring to debt accumulated 
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by authoritarian rulers for their own personal or 
political aggrandizement. (Schwartz 2007)
The IMF made the approval of the oil law one of the main 
conditions for reducing the Iraqi international debts, as 
declared on December 1, 2005 in the Paris meeting between 
the IMF and representatives of the Iraqi government 
(Chalabi 2007). Shortly thereafter, the U.S. began to 
pressure the Iraqi government to draft the Hydrocarbon law 
that would conform to the IMF guidelines, including the use 
of Profit-Sharing Agreements and other provisions that 
would open the Iraqi economy, and the oil sector in 
particular, to investment by multinational corporations.
Prior to the introduction of the privatization law 
with the PSA provisions, Iraq had 45 competitive memoranda 
of understanding with oil companies, confirmed pre- 
contractual commitments to work together on particular 
projects. The oil ministry had also confirmed work on model 
deals and regulations, including more than 100 blocks up 
for exploration, 40 in the Kurdish region and 65 in the 
rest of Iraq. Abdul Ilah Qassim al-Amir, oil adviser to the 
Iraqi prime minister, also stated that contracts signed 
under the previous regime would be reviewed. In this 
category are the Al Ahdab field for the China Petroleum
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Company; Exploration Block 8 for India's ONGC Videsh; the 
Amara field for Petro Vietnam; Block 3 for Indonesia’s 
Petro-mina; and the Al Noor field for the Syrian government 
(Jasiewicz 2007). If oil companies from nations other than 
the U.S. and Britain are willing to contract with Iraq for 
development of their oil industry without the use of 
production-sharing agreements, this threatens the ability 
of western companies to obtain the more favorable PSA 
contracts in any legislation passed by the Iraqi government 
regarding oil, therefore losing their ability to dominate 
and influence the oil industry in the region once again.
Foreign corporations are threatening U.S. supremacy in 
Iran, as well, as they ignore U.S. sanctions rules which 
prohibit investment in the Iranian energy sector. Because 
U.S. corporations are banned by U.S. sanctions from 
investing in Iranian energy, the U-. S. is threatened with 
the loss of supremacy in the region it is fighting to 
maintain. The United States has threatened to punish 
foreign firms that do business in Iran, under the Iran- 
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, but this has not deterred many 
large foreign companies from seeking access to Iran's 
reserves. According to the Department of Energy (DoE), 
Iran supplied 14% of China's oil imports in 2003. In
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October 2004, Iran signed a $100 billion, 25-year contract 
with Sinopec, a major Chinese energy firm, for joint 
development of one of its major gas fields and the 
subsequent delivery of LNG to China. In the year 2000, the 
French company TotalFina/Elf wrapped up a $2 billion deal 
to develop the South Pars oil and gas fields. In 2000, 
Royal Dutch/Shell signed an $800 million contract to 
develop the Soroush and Nowrooz offshore oilfield, In late 
2001 and early 2002, Shell brought part of the $1.1 billion 
Soroush-Nowrooz development online, and a consortium of 
three Japanese companies bought a 20 percent share in the 
Soroush-Nowrooz project. ENI-Agip acquired a 38 percent 
share in the Balal fields. Norway's Statoil signed a 
series of agreements with the National Iranian Oil Company 
to explore for oil in the Strait of Hormuz. Russia's 
Lukoil indicated that it had received approval to prospect 
along the border with Iraq in September 2003.
From 1995 to mid-1999, Iran attracted about $5 billion 
of investment in the form of joint ventures and buyback 
contracts in the oil and gas companies, and according to 
the Middle East Economic Digest, the country is expected to 
lure an additional $20 billion to its petrochemicals 
industry by 2013 (Valibeigi 2004). As non-American oil 
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companies penetrate the Iranian market, there are 
significant economic losses to the U.S. because of the lack 
of bilateral trade. The continuation of sanctions will 
ultimately serve to be a disadvantage to the U.S., in terms 
economic losses, and the weakening of relations with those 
nations who are choosing to move forward with investments 
and trade with Iran.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COMPARING BRITISH AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST: RESULTING POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN IRAQ
The British during the mandate period fought and the 
U.S. in its current occupation are fighting, desperately to 
retain influence in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, 
for their own economic and security needs. The British 
during the mandate period from 1914 to 1932, due to a lack 
of finances, domestic support, and soldiers were forced to 
rely on high levels of violence and patronage to keep the 
population from rising up and unseating them and were 
forced to leave much sooner than originally anticipated. 
Resources were channeled through indigenous Iraqis the 
British believed to have social influence in the hope that 
they could guarantee social order at the lowest possible 
cost. These decisions by the British government resulted 
in an independent Iraqi state that was built on shallow 
social foundations. The United States faces similar issues 
in. Congress presently about expenditure for the war and 
occupation, as well as the American public's growing 
concern and discontent with the occupation in Iraq. Now 
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the post-Saddaam Iraqi government is struggling to rebuild 
a stable political and economic structure for themselves.
The British recognized that they could not afford to 
govern Iraq directly as a colony, and they found a less 
overt system by using English advisers behind an Arab 
fagade, which was more economical. On October 21, 1920, 
the newly arrived civil commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, 
announced the formation of a provisional government under 
Arab ministers with British advisers. At Cairo, in March 
1921, Winston Churchill met with senior British advisers 
and worked out the administrative arrangements that were to 
endure for the next forty years. Recognizing the need to 
cut expenditures, and the fact that the mandate was 
unpopular in Iraq, Churchill decided to negotiate a treaty 
with Iraq which would both end the mandate and give Iraq a 
degree of nominal independence. The British also 
recognized, however, that Britain's position in Iraq 
depended largely upon the ruler selected, and therefore 
they imported Sharif Faisal, the former king of Syria, and 
worked out a program to ensure his election in the 
forthcoming referendum. "Popular" support was mobilized 
and his only serious opponent was arrested and deported on 
vague charges of sedition. Faisal arrived in Iraq in June 
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1921 and was declared king on July 11, 1921 (Polk 1969, p. 
126-127).
State building of the nature being attempted in Iraq 
by the U.S and its allies following the 2003 invasion, and 
formerly attempted by the British during the mandate period 
following World War I, is based upon the historic 
experience of Western Europe, "where state institutions 
evolved out of the societies they came to rule over in a 
violent competition for survival with their territorial 
rivals" (Dodge 2003, p. xxiv-xxv). State building in Iraq 
by the British in the 1920's and the U.S. presently, is 
very different from this model as, "it concerns the 
creation of state capacity by external powers, in coalition, 
with a section of the indigenous population it has selected 
as its ally" (Dodge 2003, p. xxv). The Weberian model of 
the state foreign western powers have attempted to 
implement can be defined as being,
. . . legitimized by its ability to deliver 
public goods to the population contained within 
its recognized borders through a differentiated 
set of centralized governmental institutions. 
Crucial to its ability to perform these tasks is 
the veracity of its claim to 'binding authority' 
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over its citizenship and ultimately 'over all 
actions taking place in the area of its 
jurisdiction.' A state's capacity for rule is 
ultimately grounded in the extent to which its 
'administrative staff successfully upholds the 
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force in the enforcement of its order.' 
The degree to which a state has reached this 
ideal type can be judged by the ability of its 
institutions to impose and guarantee the rule of 
law, penetrate society, mobilize the population, 
and extract resources. Ultimately, the 
sustainability of state capacity is anchored into 
the extent to which its actions are judged to be 
legitimate in the eyes of its citizens." (Dodge 
2003, p. xxiv)
Unfortunately, the Iraqi state does not so easily fit this 
model or ideal type. The state that was created in the 
aftermath of World War I that existed until the removal of 
Saddam Hussein has been dominated by four interlinked 
structural problems, as identified by Toby Dodge.
These are: first, the deployment of extreme 
levels of organized violence by the state to 
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dominate and shape society; second, the use of 
state resources- jobs, development aid, and 
patronage- to buy loyalty of sections of society; 
third, the use of oil revenue by the state to 
increase its autonomy from society; and, finally, 
the exacerbation and re-creation by the state of 
communal and ethnic divisions as strategy of 
rule. (Dodge 2003, p. 169)
All of these factors have contributed to the population's, 
view of the state as being illegitimate as well as to the 
lack of democratic rule.
As industry and commodity export became more developed 
in the Middle East, a tendency that became more and more 
common was the creation of the "rentier state" and the 
consolidation of state structures after colonization in the 
regions where territorial boundaries had been drawn before 
internal state-building occurred. In a rentier state, the 
"state is reliant not on an extraction of the domestic 
population's surplus production but on externally generated 
revenues, or rents, such as those derived from oil" (Kuru 
2002). The economy is dominated by incomes derived from 
rents, and the rentiers, or recipients of the rents, wield 
considerable political influence. The rentiers within the 
87
periphery nation live on the proceeds of capital export, 
thus the productive growth of the economy is limited 
because the income from the commodity export is distributed 
amongst the population in various ways. This serves to 
limit participation by the local population in the growth 
of the economy while allowing them to reap the benefits of 
the revenue. The core nations encourage the continuation 
of the rentier economy because they benefit from the 
dependency the rentier state has on a single commodity 
export, such as oil. The rentier state does not engage in 
large-scale industrial development because the revenues 
received from the oil are sufficient, therefore, they do 
not gain power as a capitalist competitor to core nations. 
The dependency of the core industrial nations on the oil 
resource results in demands and pressures being made on the 
rentier state by the core nation's firms and government to 
provide the oil at a desirable price. The rentier state 
financially depends on international capital inflow. The 
revenues received by the state eliminate the need for 
domestic taxation, as the wealth generated precludes the 
need to extract income from the citizenry. Since the 
people are not taxed they are therefore not given a say in 
the expenditure of the money, resulting in a lack of
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democracy. The less democratic a government, through the 
oppression of organized opposition, the more easily an 
imperial nation can manipulate the policies of the rentier 
state to its own economic and political agenda. This is 
common in the imperialism of recent times (Kuru 2002).
The existence of a rentier economy in Iraq, as well as 
several other Middle Eastern states including Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar, is one 
theory advanced to explain the predominance of 
authoritarian regimes and the apparent lack of democracy in 
the region. Iraq before the 2003 U.S. invasion, and to a 
large extent today, is experiencing the effects of the 
rentier economy through various government subsidies to the 
population for food products, oil, gasoline, fertilizers 
and pesticides. Fuel subsidies cost around $8 billion per 
year, with Iraq importing between $200 and $250 million 
worth of fuel per month (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p.
215). Many Iraqi citizens believe they are entitled to 
heavily subsidized fuel as citizens of an oil-rich country 
(Herring and Rangwala 2006, p. 223). Therefore, their 
dependence upon and loyalty to the providers of such 
subsidies outweighs their desire or ability to change the 
political structure through the democratic process/ There 
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is also little push for the development of a strong 
domestic productive sector therefore limiting employment 
opportunities or the ability for real economic growth to 
occur.
Paul Bremer during the period of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) declared that "subsidy 
elimination was more important than privatization" because 
"liberalizing prices is a necessary measure on the way to 
marketization" (Herring and Rangwa'la 2006, p. 222). 
However, without first establishing a legitimate, 
sovereign, popularly elected government capable of making 
its own choices about the future of Iraq's economy, the 
U.S. led plans for Iraq was to open the Iraqi economy and 
transform it into the U.S. version of the neoliberal model. 
To do this, the initial focus of the CPA was to end the 
Iraqi state's protectionism and domination of the economy, 
essentially its role as the rentier. The CPA then imposed 
cuts in subsidies on food imports, fertilizers, and 
pesticides, which only served to reinforce Iraq's 
dependency on food imports and aggravated the already 
burgeoning problems of unemployment and poverty. "The food 
rationing system in Iraq costs about $5 billion per year, 
about 25% of Iraqi government revenue" (Herring and
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Rangwala 2006, p. 222). And while this does undermine 
incentives for local food production, it also happens to be 
the primary source of nutrition for about 60% of the 
population, and 10% of the population need food supplies in 
addition to the ration (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p. 222). 
While there is a general agreement that Iraq needs to move 
away from the rationing and subsidy system in order to 
pursue real economic growth and become less of a rentier 
state, how to do this is the important question. To have 
the U.S. led policies defining the path for the Iraqi 
government to take while keeping its own interests ahead of 
those of the emerging Iraqi state will not ultimately lead 
to a citizenry participating more in its government, more 
democracy, stability, or economic growth for Iraq.
The U.S., as the leader of "the coalition" and the 
dominant economic and military power in the world today, is 
able to dictate the outcome of the state-building process 
in Iraq, and utilizes foreign policy and its military to 
maintain control over those areas it deems necessary for 
its own economic and security needs. The Coalition 
government was in a position of considerable political 
vulnerability within Iraq, given its status as a foreign 
occupying power. If a national political challenger to it 
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were to have been allowed to emerge and win popular 
legitimacy, the Coalition's ability to maintain control 
would have been highly limited. Thus a considerable part 
of the Coalition's work within Iraq was to prevent the 
emergence of such a challenger, while at the same time 
retaining an approach that was seen to favor political 
progress (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p. 13-14). In doing 
so, this limits Iraq's ability to create a legitimate 
government entity and pursue economic growth on its own 
terms by eliminating any arguments from Iraqis for 
achieving national self-determination through the pursuit 
of a dialogue or objection to the Coalition's policies.
The U.S. policy for post-invasion Iraq has not been 
the unfolding of predetermined plan or the gradual 
achievement of specific goals.
Instead, the very nature of that project has 
shifted rapidly and the way success has been 
defined has changed simultaneously: liberation, 
social and economic transformation, restoring 
Iraqi sovereignty, democratization, military 
self-sufficiency and avoiding sectarian conflict 
have all functioned as the major objective for 
the US at some point during the [five] years 
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since the invasion, and the tensions between 
these goals have led to a stuttering, often 
incoherent, political strategy. (Herring and 
Rangwala 2006, p. 47)
Because the U.S. did not have a clear workable plan based 
on the realities of the situation in Iraq created in the 
post-invasion period, it has been forced to act in reaction 
to developments in Iraq, and in response to domestic 
political dynamics back in the U.S.
One of the major policy objectives for the U.S. in 
Iraq was to gain permanent military bases there as part of 
the overall expansion of military presence in the region in 
order to have better control over access to resources it 
desired, namely oil and pipeline routes. In a report 
entitled Rebuilding America's Defenses, published in 
September 2000, the PNAC emphasized the centrality to US 
strategic interests of developing US military bases in the 
Middle East regardless of any dispute with Iraq or Iran:
[T]he US has for decades sought to play a more 
permanent role in the Gulf regional security. 
While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides 
immediate justification, the need for a 
substantial American force presence in the Gulf
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transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. . .[E]ven should the US-Iranian
relations improve, retaining forward-based forces 
in the region would still be an essential element 
in US security strategy given the longstanding 
American interests in the region. (Herring and 
Rangwala 2006, p. 10)
If Iraq were able to develop and maintain a stable, 
democratic, legitimate form of government the need for and 
justification of a large U.S. military presence would be 
highly compromised.
For a legitimate political center to have developed in 
Iraq there would have to have been continual negotiation 
over and challenge to the Coalition's presence and its 
plans for Iraq during transition and afterwards. However, 
the Coalition needed to continue to hold the keys to 
political authority in order for the U.S. military to 
preserve their security as they saw fit, a feature that 
remains a key requirement of the U.S. armed forces for 
perceived political and strategic reasons (Herring and 
Rangwala 2006, p. 82). Therefore, the U.S. needed to 
manage and balance the competing Iraqi political processes 
in order to maintain its unofficial retention of state 
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power, particularly give the hostility of most of Iraq's 
population to a continued role for the Coalition military 
inside Iraq. Thus, in order to retain its pre-eminence 
within Iraq, the Coalition had to forestall the creation of 
an autonomous rival center of political power. So while 
the U.S. knew that it must acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the Shi'a claim for power, through acceding to the demand 
for elections that would translate a numerical majority 
into political superiority, the U.S. also sought to ensure 
that this superiority would not seriously threaten U.S. 
autonomy in decision-making (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p.
83). The U.S. accomplished this through continued 
oversight by the U.S. on the IGC, the Coalition overruling 
and marginalizing Iraqi officials who sought to act as 
autonomous decision-makers, and the limiting of the 
authority of the central government through balancing its 
power with that of regional actors. The U.S. actions were 
not following a dispersal of power through an integrated 
hierarchy, but encouraging fragmented power.
There was a significant turn towards the use of 
tribal shaykhs, who became an alternative power 
base of the Coalition. This was not a new 
strategy for Iraq: under the League of Nations 
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mandate, the British administrators had used 
tribal leaders... as rivals to the monarch, as a 
method of limiting Faysal I's ability to campaign 
against the continuation of the mandate. (Herring 
and Rangwala 2006, p. 87-88)
Thus U.S. actions, just as British actions in a previous 
imperialist era, were driven by the desire to maintain 
control in Iraq.
The U.S. has feared that even those actors who 
have been prepared to work with the occupation 
might take Iraq in directions inimical to 
perceived U.S. interests. In this context, the 
U.S. decided to try to retain possession of the 
key levers of state power and to limit the 
emergence of a coherent Iraqi state until it 
could ensure that the state would be safe for 
U.S. interests. (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p.
94)
Due to the policies pursued by western capitalist 
powers, namely Britain and the United States, in the Middle 
East since the early 20th Century because of the abundance 
of petroleum resources in the region and the profits to be 
gained via control of this industry, the states of the 
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region have largely not developed into democratic free- 
market states. Most states in the Middle East do not have 
democratic governments, and continue to rely upon state 
revenues generated by the oil industry to support the 
majority of the population. The post-World War I mandate 
system, which was supposed to have guided the development 
of democratic states in the newly created countries 
following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, instead had 
its policies dictated by British and other European powers, 
desire to maintain control over the oil industry there and 
to ensure optimal conditions for its oil companies to 
operate. The United States too has pursued policies in the 
region for similar ends. The U.S. today continues to seek 
favorable conditions in the economies of the Middle Eastern 
states for the profits of its oil companies and to maintain 
a presence there in order to create conditions optimal for 




The history of western involvement in the Middle East 
shows that the nature of these relationships over the past 
century has been imperialist in nature, with the western 
nations being the primary beneficiaries of the 
relationships. There remains a class of people within the 
Middle Eastern nations that benefit too from the political 
and economic structure of the relationship and serve to 
perpetuate the continuation of relations with the core in a 
way that limits the growth of both a free market economy 
and more democratic political structures in the periphery 
nations. Iraq serves as a primary example of this through 
both its relations with Britain during the mandate period 
and the United States since 2003. The continuing 
dependence of the Iraqi people on the state for many of 
their basic needs in the absence of a fully democratic 
political environment shows this.
The British in the mandate period and the U.S. today 
both have similar economic motivations for their 
involvement in the Middle East, which is the desire to 
exercise control over the oil industry and benefit from oil 
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revenues. The rhetoric of bringing democracy and stability 
to the region has served in both cases as a rationale for 
continued involvement in the region. However, should a 
truly democratic political structure become powerful enough 
to assert the interests of the Iraqi people they may 
actually enact policies antithetical to western interests, 
particularly with regards to the oil industry.
This paper shows that imperialism is still a relevant 
theory as defined by Marxist theorists, particularly Harry 
Magdoff. The similarities between British policies and 
actions in the Middle East during the mandate period and 
U.S. policies and actions following World War II leading up 
to the 2003 invasion of Iraq remind us that the 
continuation of policy making with similar political and 
economic motivations, essentially to benefit the economic 
and military interests of the West, will continue to evoke 
similar outcomes. The Middle Eastern nations will continue 
to lack the political structures able to experience real 
economic growth and lack democratic structures able to 
provide for a strong, stable society able to assert their 
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